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PROPOSALS FOR INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION AFTER THE FALL OF THE
HOUSE OF ENRON
James P. Jalil*
"We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad
morals; we know now that it is bad economics."
- Franklin Delano Roosevelt
I. INTRODUCTION
In the landmark decision of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that an elemental fraud had been committed when corporate
insiders3 profited from securities transactions at the expense of an
unwary and uninformed public.4 The court noted that trading by
corporate insiders on the basis of material non-public information
frustrated "the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
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specializes in securities and corporate law. He is also an Adjunct Professor at
Fordham University School of Law.
1. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937),
available at http://www.americanpresidents.org/inaugural/31b.asp (last visited
Feb. 26, 2003).
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
3. The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur was considering a situation involving
senior management. Id. at 833. For the purposes of this Article, the definition of
"corporate insiders" includes both senior management and those who would be
considered "affiliates." 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2002) (referencing the definition of
"affiliate" in section 1841 of Title 12 of the United States Code). An "affiliate" is
defined as "any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with another company." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (2002).
4. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 833.
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that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively
equal access to material information."5 But is this expectation
realistic?
Certainly not all traders in the impersonal marketplace have
the same ability, background, knowledge or sophistication in
business and financial matters, nor do they have the same access to
material corporate information.6 The ordinary day trader cannot
call the chief financial officer of a major public company and chat
with her about the affairs of the business, as can the securities
analyst for a major brokerage house.7 Some traders have large,
well-paid, sophisticated and talented staffs to study and investigate
the intricacies of various businesses and industries.8 Some traders
are more insightful, more skillful, and frankly better investors than
others.9 Inequality among investors is a basic reality of the
marketplace.
To attract and keep investors over the long term, however,
securities markets must be perceived as taking place on a level
-playing field, with rules (securities laws) and referees (the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")) to keep the game
5. Id. at 848.
6. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 569 (1984) (discussing the differences
between traders).
7. The Securities and Exchange Commission tried to address this issue to
some extent by adopting Regulation FD. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §
243.100 (2001). Regulation FD provides that whenever a public company, or a
person acting on behalf of a public company, discloses material, non-public
information to a broker, dealer, investment adviser, investment company or
stockholder (under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the
stockholder will act on such disclosed information by buying or selling securities),
then the public company must make public disclosure of the same information.
Id. § 243.100(a). The intent behind Regulation FD was to level the playing field
so that analysts and others with access to senior management do not have an
unfair advantage over the uninformed public. See Practising Law Institute,
Regulation FD: Dealing With Analysts, 1352 PLI/Corp 1153, 1176 (2003).
8. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 570; see also Jonathan R.
Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A
Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 932 (1994) (evaluating
the resources uniquely available to only certain groups of traders).
9. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 571.
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fair.'" To support this objective, securities laws have evolved to
address the uneasy tension between marketplace confidence and
the legitimate needs of corporate insiders to purchase and sell their
company's securities." The reality is that corporate insiders will
almost always have better insight into the affairs of their employers
than will the average investor. 2  Thus, the mere possession of
material non-public information is not, in and of itself, a bar to
trading.'3 All learning on the bedrock law of insider trading flows
from this principle.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Insider trading has not always been limited by law. Prior to
the New Deal reform legislation of the 1930s, specifically the
Securities Act of 19331" ("Securities Act") and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934s ("Exchange Act"), legal prohibitions
against trading by corporate insiders were either non-existent,
covered by state securities laws, or founded on common law
theories of fraud. 6 Trading on United States securities markets,
10. See sources cited infra note 24 (supporting the argument that securities
laws have evolved to create a level playing field).
11. See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 353-54 (1988) (discussing the tension between "traditional
principles of fraud and fiduciary duty on the one hand and a more general desire
to provide equal access to material information and economic opportunity on the
other," as the impetus to create such laws).
12. See id. at 360.
13. Cf Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that the mere
possession of material, non-public information does not trigger a duty to disclose
under section 10(b), absent some fiduciary "duty to speak"); Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 659 (1983) (citing Chiarella, and noting that a finding of fraud under
10(b)(5) requires more than the mere possession of such information).
14. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
16. See Cox & Fogarty,.supra note 11, at 353; see also Freeman v. Decio, 584
F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that, absent fraud, officers and directors
may trade their own company's securities without disclosing that they are doing
so); Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371 (1945) (discussing "majority" rule
permitting insider trading); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 883 (1983) (discussing the
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which dates from the earliest days of the republic, was an open,
unregulated affair. 7 As trading was predominantly limited to
select groups of merchant and investment bankers, regulation was
largely self imposed."i
The development of the impersonal securities market began
gradually, but it is clear that it dates at least from the period after
the Civil War. 9 The growth of railroads and the large industrial
enterprises of the industrial revolution necessitated obtaining
capital from greater segments of the general population than just
the big city investment and merchant bankers.' Thus, by the turn
of the twentieth century, securities markets had grown, largely
unregulated by any statutory or administrative oversight.' Just as a
downhill skier gains speed, the pace of trading grew faster as
greater numbers of investors, fueled by an increasing prosperity,
flocked to the securities markets. By the 1920s "playing the
market" had become a national obsession.'
As the obsession turned into the nightmare of the stock
market crash of 1929, and the country slid from prosperity through
recession to economic depression, some perspectives began to
emerge from the debacle. One such perspective that endures to
general common law rule that, with some exceptions, insider trading is
permissible).
17. See 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 93-119 (2001).
18. See id.
19. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Practice of
Preferencing (Apr. 15, 1997) (discussing the role of securities specialists in the
years following the Civil War), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/prefrep.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
20. See Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the Commission Commonwealth Club San
Francisco, CA (May 17, 1996) (discussing how the capital markets helped finance
the construction of the railroads that tied the East to the West), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1996/spchl0l.txt (last visited Feb.
26, 2003).
21. See id.
22 See Ted A. Smith, Congress Must First Learn to Surf the Internet, If It
Ever Hopes to Catch the Next Wave of Securities Fraud, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 589, 591 (1999) (noting that this increase in the popularity
of securities trading was a contributing factor behind the great crash of 1929).
23. Id. at 594.
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this day is that if confidence and trust are to be restored to the
securities markets, the investing public must correctly perceive that
the securities markets are indeed a level playing field, and that
investors privy to information not available to the investing public
will not use that information to gain an advantage. Many investors
today have the perception that this is the case. Unfortunately for
them, it is not the law.
III. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The Securities Act was one of the first pieces of New Deal
legislation, enacted in a time of economic crisis.' Although it has
been amended many times since 1933, the structure that the
Securities Act crafted remains the foundation of securities
regulation.'
At its core, the Securities Act is a consumer protection
24. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968)
(stating that the goal of insider trading rules is to establish identical market risks
for all investors thereby increasing investor confidence); United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 644-45 (1997) (holding that a person who trades in
securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in
breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for
violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Wendy Ehrenkranz, Comment, Whistle
Blowing As a Rule 10b-5 Violation: Dirks v. SEC, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 987, 992
(1982) (stating that the broadening of the duty to disclose is attributable
principally to the SEC's goal of equalizing the availability of market information
onto the objectives of the federal securities laws: promoting investor confidence
and the efficient functioning of capital markets); Mark Dallas, United States v.
O'Hagan: A Failed Attempt to Protect Public Policies Underlying the Securities
Laws, 32 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1107 (1999) (noting that Congress's purpose in
enacting securities laws was to erect an efficient market and to protect investors
from insider trading which harms investor confidence).
25. In fact, the Securities Act was one of the key pieces of legislation
proposed by the Roosevelt administration in the "first 100 days" of the New
Deal. See EDWARD T. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES AcT AND
THE SEC 20-24 (1948) (describing the Act's genesis as part of the New Deal).
26. See James D. Cox, The Future Content of the US Securities Laws:
Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 11 (2000).
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statute.27 It is founded on the theory that when investors buy
securities in the public market from the issuer of those securities,
such investors are entitled to know something about that
company.' The investor is entitled to know the good, the bad and
the ugly. In other words, a company should disclose every material
fact a reasonable investor would need to know prior to making an
investment. 29  The process by which a company discloses this
information is known as registration." Simply put, a company
wishing to sell securities in the public market must file what is
known as a registration statement with the SEC, wherein it
registers the offering of its securities.31 The bulk of this registration
statement consists of a prospectus detailing all the material
information about the company, including pertinent risk factors,
financial information and a readable narrative.3" After review by
the SEC staff, the registration statement is declared effective and
27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
28. Section 5 of the Securities Act contains the principles of registration and
disclosure. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000). It is not too far
off the mark to say that the essence of the Securities Act is contained in section 5
and that the balance of the Securities Act is all but commentary. See Peter D.
Santori, Selling Investment Company Shares Via an Off-The-Page Prospectus:
"Leveling the Playing Field" or "Diminishing Investor Protection," 20 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 245, 248 (1995) (stating that the most important provision of the 1933
Act is section 5 which provides the "statutory engine that makes the 1933 Act
run").
29. The standard of materiality is often expressed by quoting from TSC
Indus. Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), which states that information is
material if a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an
investment decision. Id. at 449.
30. See Nicholas J. Guttilla, Securities Regulation-Disclosure of Intra-
Quarter Performance Information Constituting Extreme Departure from Public
Information Required in Shelf Registration Prospectus-Shaw v. Digital
Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996), 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1023
(1998) (stating that the Securities Act of 1933 requires directors to furnish
information in a registration statement through disclosure documents).
31. Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
32. See Forms for Registration Statements, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2001),
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
For a sample form S-1 and attending schedules, visit
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/s-l.htm (last visited May 2, 2002).
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the company may sell its securities in the public marketplace,
provided that each offer is accompanied by the prospectus from
the registration statement."
The theory of the Securities Act is that if proper and fair
disclosure is made by way of the prospectus, investors are better
able to make informed decisions about whether or not to invest.34
Naturally, if the disclosures contained in a prospectus are proven
faulty, incomplete or misleading in any material respect, aggrieved
investors who suffered a loss can recover the loss from the issuer of
the securities as well as its directors and the underwriters of the
offering. The company has no responsibility under the Securities
Act for continuing disclosure or for after market trading. 6
However, companies with publicly traded securities, or those that
have recently completed a registration under the Securities Act,
are required under the Exchange Act to file periodic reports
containing detailed disclosures and financial information. 7 These
reports are publicly available and are intended to give the trading
public continually accurate information about companies whose
securities are publicly traded.
33. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
34. Cf. Guttilla, supra note 30, at 1025 (stating that the Securities Act was
enacted to reduce the risk of fraudulent investment schemes).
35. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Indeed, the issuer
of the securities has no defense if a material misstatement or material omission is
proven. Directors and underwriters have what is known as a "due diligence
defense." Id. § 77k(a).
36. See id.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 771.
38. Form 10-Q is the quarterly report firms are required to file. See Sample
Form 10-Q, available at www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfinl/forms/10q.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2003). Form 10-K is the annual report for the same purpose. See Sample
Form 10-K, available at www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/10k.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2003). Form 8-K is for reporting material events and changes in the
corporate structure not previously reported on Form 10Q. See Sample form 8-K,
available at www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/8-k.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2003).
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IV. SALES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS
What does this have to do with sales of securities by corporate
insiders? The Securities Act did not stop at requiring disclosure on
the part of a company issuing securities. As a general matter,
absent an exemption, when corporate insiders sell securities in the
public markets, the offer of those securities must be registered with
the SEC in exactly the same way as if the company itself were
issuing the securities.39 This involves filing a registration statement
with the SEC, in effect registering the offer by the insider."0 A
prospectus must disclose the affairs of the company, including all
facts material to investors.' If a material misstatement or omission
is found in such registration statement, both the selling corporate
insider and the company itself would be liable for damages.'2
The Securities Act does not deal with open market purchases
by corporate insiders.43 However, Rule 10b-18 " issued by the SEC
39. This is because of a definition clause in the definition of "underwriter."
Section 5 of the Securities Act requires the registration of offers of securities by
the issuer of those securities as well as by any underwriter of the offering. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e. Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act
defines an underwriter as one who purchases securities from the issuer with an
intent to distribute those securities into the hands of the public. Securities Act of
1933 § 2(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11). The last clause of section 2(a)(11) adds
the notion that one who purchases from a corporation insider (essentially) for the
purpose of public distribution is deemed to have purchased from the issuer itself.
Id. Hence that person is an "underwriter" and therefore that offering must be
registered under section 5. It may not be elegant drafting, but it has stood the
test of time. See Laventhall v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 410 (8th Cir.
1983) (noting that corporate insiders are prohibited from trading without
disclosing material, inside information); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating the goal of insider trading rules is to establish
identical market risks for all investors, thereby increasing investor confidence).
40. See cases cited supra note 39.
41. See cases cited supra note 39.
42. Securities Act of 1933 § 11.
43. See Betty Ann Maxey, Securities Regulation -Private Actions Under Rule
lOb-5-Damage Causation for Nondisclosure in the Open Market, 51 TUL. L. REV.
1293, 1294 (1977) (citing Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), in
which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held open market purchases by insiders
were not causally connected to losses suffered by plaintiffs, who had sold their
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under the Exchange Act does contain provisions regulating the
manner in which corporate insiders may purchase securities on the
open market.45
Notwithstanding the registration provisions of the Securities
Act, the vast majority of sales by corporate insiders do not go
through this registration procedure. If all did, then both corporate
insiders and their companies would be personally liable whenever
disclosures made in the prospectus contained material
misstatements or omissions.46 Thus, if the formulation adopted by
the Securities Act in 1933 were universally followed, the playing
field would be level, or at least less skewed toward corporate
insiders and against the investing public. Armed with the
prospectus relating to the sale by the corporate insider, the
anonymous investor would be in possession of all material and
timely facts about the company prior to making an investment
decision.' In addition, as with sales by the company itself, if the
disclosures found in the prospectus proved to be faulty in any
material respect, remedies for damages would be available from
the company as well as the corporate insider."8
So why are all sales by corporate insiders to the public not
subject to the requirements that the Securities Act originally
intended? The reason has to do with simple expediency. 9 The
securities prior to the information being available to the public. Therefore,
plaintiffs failed to prove a claim for damages based upon the insiders' violation of
the security laws).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (2001).
45. Rule 10b-18 allows an issuer to repurchase its own shares under certain
conditions. See id. An issuer may want to repurchase some of its own shares for
several reasons, which include a change in capital structure, providing a more tax-
efficient distribution of income to shareholders, creating a positive signal to the
market, or defending against a prospective takeover. Issuer repurchase is
permitted under Rule 10b-18 provided certain specific time, pricing and volume
restrictions are satisfied. See id.
46. Securities Act of 1933 § 11.
47. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
48. Securities Act of 1933 § 11.
49. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 144, Exchange Act Release No. 5223,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 78,487, at 81,056 (Jan. 11,
1972). But see Martha Jane Snyder, Securities Regulation: Rule 144-From
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registration process is cumbersome, time consuming and
expensive."0 As a result, the SEC adopted Rule 144, instituting a
system whereby corporate insiders may sell securities: i) without
having to go through the registration process, ii) without having to
deliver a prospectus to the investing public; and iii) without having
to make any disclosure about the company at all.'
A. Rule 144
A corporate insider may sell securities of his employer in the
public markets without complying with registration, disclosure and
prospectus requirements if he complies with the three basic
requirements of Rule 144.52 First, his company must be a public
company and be current in all its filings with the SEC as required
by the Exchange Act. 3 Second, all sales must be in "regular way"
brokerage transactions. 4 Third, within any three-month period the
Lawyers to Mathematicians, 40 TENN. L. REv. 399 (noting that the impetus for
the adoption of Rule 144 as the prospective purchaser's need for information).
50. A registration statement may take several weeks from preparation to
filing with the SEC to effectiveness, may cost tens of thousands of dollars in legal
and accounting fees, and may distract senior management during the process. See
Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Advisory Committee on the
Capital Formation and Regulation Processes, pt. II, at 2 (July 24, 1996)
(identifying the high transaction costs, including legal, accounting, printing, and
filing fees, involved when filing a registration statement), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003); Id. at
app. A, tbl 2 (finding one study that found that the average length of time for a
filed registration statement to become effective for an IPO is 38.9 days).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 230.144(c). The theory is that the public thus has all relevant
material information necessary to make an investment decision. The problem of
course is twofold. First, in a fast moving economy when facts become material
after the filing of the last periodic report, but before the due date of the next,
information is often dated by the time the public sees it. Second, there is no
liability to the corporate insider for a material misstatement in the company's
Exchange Act report, as there would be in the case of a registered offering under
the Securities Act. Id.
54. Id. § 230.144(g). "Regular way" transactions are ordinary sales into the
impersonal market, delivery and settlement of which is made on the third full
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corporate insider may sell no more than the greater of i) one
percent of the class of securities outstanding; or ii) the average
weekly trading volume of the security being sold during the four
weeks preceding any sale. " This last restriction is known as the
"volume limitation."
If a corporate insider follows Rule 144, no registration is
required for her sale, meaning that no prospectus offering detailed
disclosure about the company need be delivered to the investing
public. 6 Rule 144 in effect frustrates the original intention of the
Securities Act, which requires the registration of offers of securities
by corporate insiders. 7 There may be valid reasons why it makes
sense to allow sales under Rule 144 without registration. 8
Nevertheless, the fact remains; it was not what Congress had in
mind in 1933."9
Consider, for example, the corporate insider with material
information concerning his company that is unknown to the
general public, and has not yet been disclosed in the company's
current filings with the SEC under the Exchange Act. If the insider
were to comply with the registration requirements of the Securities
Act, as originally intended by Congress, this new information
business day following the transaction (for government securities transactions,
the settlement is the first full business day following the transaction). See
BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 472 (5th ed. 1998).
Negotiated or private sales are outside the scope of Rule 144. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.144.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e).
56. If the securities being sold are "restricted securities," that is, securities
that were purchased from the issuer in a private transaction, then the corporate
insider must hold such securities for at least a year before they can be sold, and a
simple Form 144 disclosing the sale must be filed with the SEC. Id. If the
securities were purchased on the open market or from the company pursuant to
an effective registration statement, as is the case with most stock options, there is
no holding period requirement and no Form 144 need be filed. Id.
57. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
58. See Revisions to Rule 144, Exchange Act Release No. 6488, [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,429, at 86,249 (Sept. 23, 1983)
("The purpose of [Rule 144] is to relax restrictions on resales of securities that
are more burdensome than necessary.").
59. See S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 47-50 (1934); Comm. on Banking and
Currrency, 77 CONG. S. REs. 84, 2982-83 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher).
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would be disclosed in the requisite registration statement. For
sales by corporate insiders made pursuant to Rule 144, as the vast
majority are, no disclosures need be made. The insider is
seemingly free to trade with impunity.
B. A Legal Remedy Is Fashioned By The Courts
Congress, aware of this problem, attempted to address it to
some degree in the Exchange Act." Where Congress has left off,
the courts have advanced the cause of the unwary public.
63
1. The Short Swing Profit Rule
The Exchange Act contains two provisions directly addressing
insider trading.' Taking these provisions out of order, section
16(b) is the well-known "short-swing profit" rule. 65 The rule
prohibits insiders from actively trading their company's securities.66
60. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
62. Courts have created an implied private cause of action under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2001). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
63. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196 (stating that, while Congress did not
expressly contemplate a civil remedy for those harmed by Rule 10b-5 violations,
the existence of a private cause of action for such violations is well established).
64. These are: Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); and Rule 10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R
§ 240.10b-5 (2001). There are, however, other provisions in the Exchange Act
which deal with the standard of pleadings for insider trading cases and which
address the issue of liability, both to the SEC and private litigants. The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) specifically addresses pleading
requirements, creating a heightened standard for securities litigation. 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(2).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
66. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243
(1976) (noting that Congress enacted § 16(b) for the purpose of curbing insider
trading); see also Hearing on Stock Exchange Practices Before Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 6557 (1934) (explaining that the purpose of
section 16(b) is "to prevent directors receiving the benefits of short-term
speculative swings on the securities of their own companies, because of inside
information.").
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It does this by requiring that an insider who sells his company's
securities within six months of purchase to turn over to the
company any profit gained in that trade. 67 Interestingly, though,
section 16(b) does not require any element of knowledge or use of
non-public information by the insider in order for liability to
attach.8
2. Section 16(a) Reporting Requirement
The second provision of the Exchange Act dealing with insider
trading is section 16(a),69 which until recently required corporate
insiders to report their transactions in their companies' securities
the month after the transactions were made." If a transaction had
been with the company itself-for example, if the corporate insider
sold securities directly to his employer-the public filing disclosing
the transaction did not have to be made until 45 days after the end
of the fiscal year in which the transaction took place. 1 To make
matters worse, these reports-both monthly and annual-are
among the few the SEC still requires be made via mailed hard
67. The converse is also true. If there is a sale and subsequent purchase
within six months, there is equal liability, in this case for the loss avoided. 15
U.S.C. § 78p.
68. It is said that the purpose of section 16(b) is "prophylactic" and as such
no showing of use of material non-public information is required. See Nathanson
v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (explaining the
most efficient application of the "prophylactic purpose" of section 16(b)); In re
Haven Indus. Inc., 462 F. Supp. 172, (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting Nathanson for the
same proposition).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a).
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also SEC Rule 16(a)(3), which proscribes the reporting
requirements for transactions and holdings, and provides, in relevant part:
Initial statements of beneficial ownership of equity securities required by
section 16(a) of the Act shall be filed on Form 3. Statements of changes in
beneficial ownership required by that section shall be filed on Form 4. Annual
statements shall be filed on Form 5. At the election of the reporting person, any
transaction required to be reported on Form 5 may be reported on an earlier
filed Form 4.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(f)(1).
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copy, furthering the delay. On July 30, 2002 President Bush
signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002."3 Included in this
legislation was a provision requiring the report of an insider trade
to be made two days after effected. However, electronic real time
filings will not be required to be made until July 30, 2003."s Until
then, these reports will continue to be mailed to the SEC in hard
copy form.76
Presumably, the purpose of these filings is to make the public
aware of what corporate insiders have been doing with the
securities of their company-to provide insight into how those
insiders view the securities. The filing requirements do not provide
for real time disclosure of trading by corporate insiders with non-
public, material information, but only require after-the-fact
disclosure of such transactions. Furthermore, the required filings
do not provide insight into why the corporate insider made the
purchases or sales. That is left to be divined by the investing
public.
3. What Recourse to the Public?
So where does that leave the unwary and uninformed public?
Has the public no redress if corporate insiders trade on the basis of
material non-public information? One would think that over the
years, Congress would have established some direct statutory
prohibition, or at least have offered some guidance in the area of
trading on the basis of non-public information by corporate
insiders. Unfortunately, it has not. The courts have, however,
fashioned a framework of jurisprudence that has evolved over
many years and many judicial decisions. 8 Despite this framework,
72. This will remain the case until July 2003. See infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
73. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
74. Id. § 16(a)(2)(C).
75. Id. § 16(a)(4).
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
78. See generally Lisa J. Finnell, United States v. Carpenter: Second Circuit
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the structure of the case law may not be as clear as expected. The
ambiguity stems from the way the courts have used Rule 10b-5 in
the area of corporate insider trading.9
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act permits the SEC to adopt
rules regulating deceptive and manipulative conduct. 80 Under this
authority the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5," the workhorse of
securities enforcement.82 The problem with using Rule 10b-5 as an
enforcement tool against the practice of trading on non-public
information is that nowhere in the Rule is insider trading
mentioned." To further complicate matters, the theoretical basis
of Rule 10b-5 is the prohibition of deceptive and manipulative
conduct in the context of securities transactions. Trading by
Overextends the Misappropriation Theory of Criminal Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 605 (1987) (stating that the absence of a statutory definition of insider trading
has led to expansive interpretation of Rule lob-5 by the courts).
79. See id. at 609.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). The actual text of this much quoted rule is
as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
Id. Much like the Big Bang, from these few words, there has developed an entire
universe of law.
82. See Paul S. Maco, Building a Strong Subnational Debt Market: A
Regulator's Perspective, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL. & Bus. 1, 18 (2001) (noting that §
10b of the Exchange Act is the well-known workhorse of U.S. securities
litigation); see also Kevin C. Bartels, Click Here to Buy the Next Microsoft: The
Penny Stock Rules, Online Microcap Fraud, and the Unwary Investor, 75 IND. L.J.
353, 354 (2000) (noting that since being added to the Exchange Act, § 10b has
become the workhorse of the securities fraud regulation under the Act).
83. See Finnell, supra note 78, at 607-08 (discussing the confusion caused by
Congress and the SEC neglecting to define insider trading in section 10b and
Rule lOb-5, respectively).
84. Rule lOb-5 is, in fact, entitled Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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corporate insiders while in possession of information not known to
the investing public may constitute a sharp practice or unfair
advantage, but there is some question as to whether it is
manipulative or deceptive.85 Nevertheless, courts have not been
shy about taking the round peg of Rule 10b-5 and using it to plug
the square hole of insider trading."6
The courts have fashioned a common law structure that strains
the very language of Rule 10b-5Y If trading on the basis of non-
public information is itself a "deceptive and manipulative device,"
following the language of Rule 10b-5, then if an investor has
material non-public information about a particular public
company, he would presumably be barred from trading the
securities of that company. Consequently, the playing field would
be level. Indeed, many believe that this is the law." Unfortunately,
85. See Kim Lane Schepple, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider
Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 125 (1993) (stating that "a fiduciary
relationship creates an obligation not to use any information acquired within the
relationship only because such relationships provide privileged access to
information."). Courts have considered the purchase or sale of securities while in
possession of material, non-public information a "deceptive device" under Rule
lOb-5 without equalizing disclosure. See Julia K. Cronin et al., Securities Fraud, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1277, 1293-97 (2001). Though the courts employed this
broad interpretation of the "deceptive device" required to bring the purchase or
sale within the ambit of lOb-5, prosecutors had difficulty prosecuting cases under
that theory, and urged the court to utilize the "misappropriation theory" set forth
in United States v. O'Hagan,. 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). Id. Under the
"misappropriation theory" a user of material, non-public information is liable for
the trader's misappropriation of that information. Id. The "deceptive device"
prong is satisfied when the user of the information "feigns loyalty" to the
provider, while trading on such information for profit. Id. The rule requiring that
a fiduciary relationship exist in a finding of insider trading is preserved. Id.
86. See, e.g., O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53; SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48-49
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the personal benefit requirement of Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 659 (1983), can be satisfied by a showing of friendship); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that misappropriation theory
was an appropriate rationale to demonstrate insider trading under Rule 10b-5).
87. See Finnell, supra note 78, at 607-08.
88. See id. at 611 ("[The] strong deterrent effect of an action by the SEC
under existing law is significantly diluted by a general misconception of what is
actually proscribed.").
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it is not.89 The mere possession of material inside information, in
and of itself, is not a bar to trading.'
What the. courts have done is to start the engine of the law of
insider trading at Rule 10b-5, then steer a course somewhere in the
direction of the law of fiduciary responsibility.9 Therefore, the
question of whether trading on material, non-public information is
indeed "deceptive and manipulative," for the purposes of Rule
10b-5, turns on whether a fiduciary relationship factors into the
equation.92 The fiduciary relationship may be to the company
itself, its stockholders, or the trader's employer.93 It is not
necessary that the trader or the employer have any connection with
the company whose stock is being traded, but there has to be a
fiduciary relationship somewhere."
Therefore, whether trading on non-public information
constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5 depends on the trader.95 The
playing field is never truly level. Some get the benefit of unfair
advantage over the uninformed public while others do not.96 For
example, consider the non-public material fact that a company's
sales are down sharply in the last quarter of the year. It would be a
violation for that company's accountant, who is reviewing the
numbers, to trade on that information. ' But if the accountant
89. Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that the mere
possession of material, non-public information does not trigger a duty to disclose
under section 10(b), absent some fiduciary "duty to speak").
90. See id.
91. See Finnell, supra note 78.
92. See id.; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
93. See Finnell, supra note 78, at 614-16.
94. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222; United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 659 (1983); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
95. See Finnell, supra note 78, at 622 (noting that neither the language nor
the legislative history of section 10 (b) indicated congressional intent to create a
general duty among market participants to abstain from trading based on
nonpublic information absent a specific relationship between two parties creating
such a duty).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 633; Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026 ("[S]ection 10 (b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 proscribe an employee's
unlawful misappropriation from his employer... of material nonpublic
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accidentally left her work papers on the seat of a commuter train, a
stranger to the company who picked them up could trade on that
information without violating Rule 10b-5.9" Trading by the
accountant, in this example, is "deceptive and manipulative" based
on the accountant's fiduciary obligation to the company, while
trading by the fellow commuter, who owes no such fiduciary
obligation, is not."
Yet nowhere in Rule 10b-5 is the concept of fiduciary
relationship expressed." That idea has been hand crafted by the
courts.' Consider this in relationship to the ideal expressed by the
Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur.2 The law turns not on the
fact that an unwary investor has been fleeced, but on who did the
fleecing.13
Where does that leave our corporate insider? Surely a
corporate insider holds a fiduciary relationship to his employer, if
not the employer's stockholders. Not surprising, courts have had
no difficulty in finding the requisite fiduciary relationship to find
trading by corporate insiders on the basis of material non-public
information to be a violation of Rulel0b-5.'"
However, this leads to another theoretical maze. May it not
be said that at least the senior management of any publicly traded
company are almost always in possession of information that is not
public and may very well be material? As they have an obvious
fiduciary relationship to the company and its stockholders, would
information... in connection with a scheme to purchase and sell securities.").
98. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (holding that a duty to disclose or abstain does
not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information).
99. The commuter owes no fiduciary obligation, so there is no Rule 10b-5
liability. This would not be the case if the information concerned a tender offer.
Rule 14e-3 provides that no one may trade while in possession of non-public
information concerning a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e (2001).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
101. See generally Finnell, supra note 78.
102. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). For a discussion of this ideal, see supra note 5
and accompanying text.
103. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 833.
104. Cf. id. (mentioning an individual's obligation to either divulge non-public
information or abstain from trading on the basis of non-public information).
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that not constitute an almost permanent bar to trading? For many
years this particularly nasty little problem has lived under the rug,
near the edge, having been swept there by a law that did not care
to deal with this troublesome reality. 10 5
In the last several years, however, the issue has surfaced,
forcing both the courts and the SEC to address the problem."6 The
first of these rulings was made by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Teicher.17  The court adopted a rather strict stance,
holding that a corporate insider violates Rule 10b-5 if he trades
while knowingly possessing non-public material information. 8
This ought to have struck fear into the hearts of corporate insiders.
But the stance has since been softened.
4. Use versus Possession
In 1998, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a more pragmatic
approach in SEC v. Adler." Or at least it thought it did. The court
crafted the "use versus possession" test. Under this test, the mere
possession of material non-public information on the part of a
corporate insider is not a bar to trading."° To implicate Rule 10b-5
(and the requisite breach of fiduciary duty), the material non-
public information must have been the basis of the insider's trade.
.. If it can be shown that the corporate insider would have traded
105. Public companies often have policies prohibiting trades within a certain
number of days of a public announcement of earnings so as to avoid any
appearance of trading on non-public information. See Dan Bailey, New Insider
Trading Rules (June 2001), available at
http://www.arterhadden.comlpublications/other/inside.asp (last visited Feb. 26,
2003). However, these types of safeguards do little to address the problem of
corporate insiders generally having a better understanding of the affairs of the
public company due to access to non-public information that is often of a
material nature. Id.
106. See id.
107. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 976 (1993).
108. Id. at 121.
109. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
ifo. Id. at 1337.
111. Id. at 1325.
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anyway, regardless of the information, then there is no violation of
Rule 10b-5."2 For the insider to be liable, there must be a showing
that, but for the information, and the advantage gained over the
uninformed impersonal marketplace, the insider would not have
made the trade."3 Following SEC v. Adler, the Ninth Circuit also
adopted this use versus possession test."'
In light of this changing approach to the standard for 10b-5
violations by corporate insiders, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-111' in
2000.16 Rule 10b5-1 acknowledges that the mere possession of
material non-public information by a corporate insider who trades
the company's securities is not, in and of itself, a violation of Rule
10b-5." 7 There must be use of that information." 8
The SEC added the subtle twist that when a corporate insider
trades while in possession of material non-public information there
is a presumption that he used that information as the basis of the
trade."9 This presumption may be rebutted by certain defenses
available to the corporate insider.Y However, these defenses are
limited to situations establishing that the insider's desire or intent
to trade existed before he obtained the information at issue.121
112- Id. at 1334 (quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)).
113. Id. at 1337.
114. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1) (2001).
116. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51736-37
(Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (discussing the various approaches
courts took to 10b-5 and the SEC's attempt to balance these views).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 240.10b-5(1)(b).
120. The affirmative defenses listed in Rule 10b-5(1) are: before becoming
aware of the information, the person had:
(1) Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security,
(2) Instructed another person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing
person's account, or
(3) Adopted a written plan for trading securities.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1)(c)(1)(i)(A).
121. Id.
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V. CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ABOUT TRADING BY
INSIDERS
Notwithstanding the elusive quest for a level playing field as
elucidated by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur,'22 the
opinion has sometimes been advanced that trading by corporate
insiders is actually beneficial and conducive to a healthy, rational
market.'" Like scavengers who tidy up nature, trading by
corporate insiders on the basis of material, non-public information
is seen as serving the common good by tidying up the
marketplace.2 Such market activity adjusts the trading price of a
security to its "true" value."z Under this analysis, injured public
buyers and sellers are sacrificed to a greater goal-market
efficiency. 26  In addition, insider trading prohibitions are
sometimes blamed for forcing public companies to inopportunely
disclose information better kept confidential. 27
Experts have been debating the efficiency and efficacy of
corporate insider trading for years.'" However, three issues
relating to such trading merit particular emphasis. The first is the
importance of public perception9 The number of people who
122. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
123. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 16.
124. See David D. Haddock & Jonathon R. Macey, A Coasian Model of
Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1986) (discussing the effects of
insider trading on share prices).
125. See id. at 1461-62.
126. See id. at 1449.
127. See generally Nicholas K. Georgakapoulous, Insider Trading As a
Transaction Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and Optimization of
Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1993).
128. Compare H. L. Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director
from a Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REv. 267 (1910) (discussing the negative aspects
concomitant with the practice by insiders of trading securities based upon non-
public information), with HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966) (arguing for less restrictive regulation of insider trading because
market efficiency would be increased).
129. The perception stated in Texas Gulf Sulphur has not seriously been
refuted. For a discussion of this perception, see supra notes 2-5 and
accompanying text.
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own securities in the United States has reached record levels.'30
The growth of 401(k) plans, IRAs and self-directed retirement
accounts, along with a prolonged period of national prosperity,
notwithstanding a recent bear market, have all contributed to this
phenomenon.' That widely distributed securities ownership is a
good thing is not seriously open to question.'32 It generates
liquidity, a vast reservoir of capital to fuel a growing economy, and
allows more Americans to share in the vast richness of the
American bounty. "3 Underpinning the exodus from traditional
havens, such as bank savings accounts and debt obligations, must
surely be confidence in equity markets. 4 This is confidence in the
future, confidence in the strength of the American economy, and
confidence in America itself. This trend also shows confidence in
the structure and elemental fairness of the securities markets.'35
Nothing-not wars, not recessions, not political
uncertainties-does greater damage to confidence in securities
130. See David Cay Johnston, As Ye Profit, So Shall Ye Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1999, § 3, at 11.
131. See Laura M. Holson, The Deal Still Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, § 3,
at 1; see also John McClaughry, Who Owns America? A New Declaration of
Independence, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, Oct. 2000, at 59 (book review) (noting
how 401(k), IRA, and pension account ownership has led to increased asset
ownership by Americans).
132. See generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1218
(1999) (discussing Alford Berle's and Gardiner Means' view that the stock
market functions to provide liquidity to stockholders).
133. See id. See generally Jay Norman, Not Going Public? Consider Employee
Stock Ownership, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 24, 2000, at E3 (noting how
employee stock ownership in privately held companies can help resolve certain
liquidity problems); Letter From the Editors, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Aug. 2002, at
14 (noting that increased stock ownership is a way for blacks to achieve the
American dream).
134. See generally Jerry Duggan, Note, Regulation FD: SEC Tells Corporate
Insiders to "Chill Out", 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 159, 170 (2001) ("[P]erceived
inherent unfairness leads not only to investor suspicion, but also to
nonparticipation in the market by possible investors.").
135. See generally Adam Smith, Jump-Start the Economy, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Dec. 15, 2002, at G1 (noting that people will not invest if they believe the
system is unfair).
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markets than the perception that trading is not elementally fair to
all."6 There can be no doubt that the average investor understands
that insider trading takes place. "7 But the knowledge that it is not
permitted, and that the SEC is ever vigilant in detecting and
preventing such activity, is enough to establish the requisite
investor confidence."8 To remove all restriction on corporate
insider trading in the name of efficiency, as has been suggested by
some commentators, "9 would do far more harm than good.' ° The
view that market efficiency is more desirable than investor
confidence comes from the wrong end of the telescope.41
Second, there is some doubt that insider trading would
efficiently affect the price of traded securities at all-or at least
sufficiently to achieve the effect desired by those opposing
regulation.' 2 Clearly the massive sales by insiders of the Enron
Corporation did not efficiently adjust market prices of the common
136. Consider public reaction to the revelation of sales by corporate insiders in
the declining days of Enron Corporation. Lost in the tumult and outcry has been
any congratulations to the insiders for contributing to the more efficient pricing
of Enron stock. Indeed, given the vast public float of Enron stock, there may be
some question whether even massive selling by corporate insiders had any real
effect on the price of Enron, given all extraneous facts.
137. See Jerry Knight, Even if It Walks & Talks Like Insider Trading, It May
Not Be, WASH. POST, May 22, 1990, at D3 (noting that insider trading shakes the
average investor's confidence in the market).
138. The SEC, like the IRS, seems at times to use the "in terrorum" effect of
high profile, well publicized, prosecutions to achieve and maintain a perception
of vigilance. See Gekko Redux; Adelphia Arrests Show the Party's Over, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 26, 2002, at A26.
139. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 16. See generally Robert Prentice, An
Ethics Lesson for Business Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at A19 (noting
that finance professors at many business schools believe that insider trading rules
hurt the market's efficiency and that "many business professors impart to their
students an impression that the law exists simply to be manipulated or evaded.").
140. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice
Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REv. 13, 46 (1998)
(discussing various ills that can result when insider trading is allowed).
141. See id.
142. See John R. Beeson, Comment, Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A
Proposed Regulatory Reform of the Misappropriation Theory, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1077, 1092-93 (1996) (claiming that empirical evidence shows that trading on
non-public insider information does not significantly affect market prices).
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stock in that case.143 To be sure, there may be situations when
trading by corporate insiders would efficiently adjust the price; but
other times that would not be so, as in the case of public companies
with massive public floats and large trading volumes."4 The
question, then, is whether the goal of efficiency in some cases
warrants the destruction of investor confidence in the fairness of
securities markets.
Which leads to the third and perhaps most persuasive
argument against the removal of restrictions on corporate insider
trading: The theory of the corporation is the theory of capitalism
itself. That is, that wealth (in the economic sense, not the personal
sense) is created by the partnership of labor and capital.45 Capital,
in a corporation, is the contribution made by the holders of the
corporation's securities; the stockholders.146  Communism would
eliminate capital, 7 and socialism would place capital in the hands
of the state.'4 In the capitalistic system, labor is contributed by
every employee, from the day laborer to the Chief Executive
Officer.'49 Over time, it has become accepted managerial theory to
incentive-ize labor, particularly for those in positions of senior
143. Enron heads Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling profited to the tune of $247
million and $89 million dollars respectively from salaries and the sale of Enron
stock prior to its demise. See Ian Cheng, Survivors Who Laughed All the Way to
the Bank: Barons of Bankruptcy Part I, FIN. TIMES (London), July 31, 2002, at 10.
144. See Beeson, supra note 142, at 1093.
145. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on
the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 939, 950 n.25 (1985).
146. 18a AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 431 (1985).
147. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 374 (2000) (defining
Communism as "a system of government in which the state plans and controls the
economy.").
148. See id. at 1649-50 (defining socialism as "[a]ny of various theories or
systems of social organization in which the means of producing and distributing
goods is owned collectively or by a centralized government that often plans and
controls the economy.").
149. See Houman Shadab, Capitalism: Frequently Asked Questions (1999)
(stating that "in a more fundamental sense, a capitalist is anyone.., from a
janitor to a millionaire ... who lives solely by his own effort and who respects the
rights of others."), available at http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/-shadab/capit-
2.html#1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
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management, with equity ownership.'5 ° This better marries the
interests of the capital providers (the stockholders) with labor
(senior management). Therefore, as the stockholders succeed in
increased value of their capital, so too does labor benefit. This is
the rationale for finding it beneficial that labor, particularly senior
management, join the true owners of the corporation in reaping the
rewards of success.'5'
Stock ownership by labor is not, and never has been, seen as a
device to render these employees of the stockholders obscenely
wealthy, and certainly not in enormous disproportion to the
stockholders and the total distributive profit of the business
enterprise itself. '52 In addition, when corporate insiders trade on
material non-public information, they do so, by definition, at the
expense of their employers, the stockholders.'53 This disunites the
community of interest that is the goal of having labor participate in
stock ownership in the first place." It is this diversity of interest
analysis that has been the basis of courts' fiduciary obligation
standard for corporate insider trading cases brought under Rule
10b-5. 55
VI. MODEST PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF SALES BY INSIDERS
The owners of the corporation employ managers to efficiently
150. See Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate
Performance Among Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 60, 60-61
(1996).
151. See id.
152. See generally id.
153. See, e.g., Timothy M. Wong, United States v. O'Hagan: SEC Prevails on
Misappropriation Theory, Yet May Now Face Heightened Standard of Proof for
Securities Insider Trading, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 841, 843 (1998).
154. See generally Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer
Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 75 (1998)
(mentioning benefits of employee involvement in stock ownership).
155. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (noting that
"[a]pplication of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate
insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their
own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic
information.").
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and profitably run the corporation for the benefit of its owners, the
stockholders. "6 The corporation does not exist to feather the bed
of its employees. It exists to create value for its owners.' To the
extent that some employees also become holders of their
employer's securities, it seems self evident that their fiduciary
obligation to their employers must take precedence.'58 It is wise
and efficacious to link the prosperity of the employees with their
employers, and so security ownership by corporate insiders is a
good thing.'59 But it is a good thing only so long as the interests of
labor and capital are linked, and the incentive remains to maximize
value for the owners at large through proper and competent
management of the corporation. 60
When corporate insiders trade in the corporation's securities
in any manner, self-interest must obviously overtake proper
interest in management for stockholder benefit. Clearly, however,
any suggestion that corporate insiders never be permitted to trade
in the securities of their employer is neither fair not realistic. It
would, however, be interesting to see if senior managers better
managed for the long term interests of the stockholders if they
could not sell their securities until the earlier of their retirement or
five years after they were no longer employed. It may be argued
that American corporations would be managed far differently, and
perhaps far more prudently. But such a proposal is not realistic.
On a more realistic note, this article proposes the following
conditions to level the playing field.
156. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (Mike Greenwald ed. 1984).
157. See id. That is not to say the corporation owes no obligation to its
employees, vendors, creditors or society in general. See id.
158. Michael J. Kennedy, The Business Judgment Syllogism-Premises
Governing Board Activity, 1316 PLI/Corp 285, 294 (June 2001) ("The duty of
loyalty requires that a director be disinterested and independent, and that his or
her decisions and actions be motivated only by the best interests of the
corporation and its stockholders.").
159. See generally Blasi et al., supra note 150 (containing empirical data
pointing towards this conclusion).
160. See id.
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A. Registration
Registration of public offers and sales of securities by insiders
is required under the Securities Act."' This is what was intended at
the beginning of federal securities legislation, and pre-dates the
SEC itself.162 A corporate insider could always avail herself of the
registration procedure prescribed by the Securities Act, in the case
of a sale, in which case all the following proposals would no longer
be applicable.
B. Prior Notice
With respect to any transaction not involving a registration
under the Securities Act, whether pursuant to Rule 144 or
otherwise and whether a purchase or sale, prior notice would have
to be filed with the SEC (rather than subsequent notice as now
required under section 16(a) of the Exchange Act 63). The notice
would have to be filed electronically, be made immediately public
and state the nature of the proposed transaction, the amount to be
purchased or sold and the reasons for the transaction." No trade
could be made until 10 days after such filing. This would certainly
make the price more efficient, and would thus would address the
concerns of those that would eliminate insider trading prohibitions.
The only difference would be that the stockholders, rather than the
employees of the stockholders, would be the beneficiaries of the
161. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
162. See Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws That Govern the
Securities Industry (stating that the "Securities Act of 1933 requires that investors
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being
offered for public sale," that "a primary means of accomplishing [this goal] is the
disclosure of important financial information through the registration of
securities" and that the SEC itself was not created by Congress until the passage
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 (last modified Aug. 8, 2000).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000).
164. See Press Release, Securities Exchange Commission, SEC to Propose
New Corporate Disclosure Rules (Feb. 13, 2002) (outlining the current proposals
to update and modify the public disclosure rules), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-22.txt (last visited Apr. 9, 2002).
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efficiency.
This proposal merely reverses the timing of the existing
requirement65 to make public the details of purchases and sales by
corporate insiders. Prior notification allows the market to react
prior to the transaction rather than subsequent to it. This reverses
the advantage and restores the concept that the corporation,
including all information about it, belongs properly to its owners,
the stockholders, and not their employees.'66 The proposal goes
further to underscore this proper relationship by requiring the
corporate insider to state the reason for the sale. Balancing the
equities, it seems that the employers, the stockholders, should
know why a member of senior management is purchasing or selling
securities of their company.
C. Adjustment of Volume Limitation
Rule 144 volume limitations should not relate to the amount of
securities outstanding or traded, but rather to the percentage of the
ownership of the corporate insider. Outstanding securities of many
public companies are so large in number and trading so
voluminous that many corporate insiders can sell their entire
holdings, totaling massive amounts of securities, and still be within
Rule 144 volume limitations.'67 Under the suggested proposal, a
corporate insider may not sell more than 10% of his holdings in
any three-month period without the filing of a registration
statement. Similar limitations on purchases may also be imposed,
such as percentages of compensation.
Volume limitations were originally incorporated into Rule 144
to protect the market from large blocks being traded without the
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
166. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider
Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 303, 308, 352-53
(1998) (discussing pre-trading disclosure).
167. See Joseph I. Goldstein et al., An Investment Masquerade: A Descriptive
Overview of Penny Stock Fraud and the Federal Securities Laws, 47 Bus. LAW.
773, 800 (1992) (discussing the ability of an insider to sell securities without
violating the volume limitations of Rule 144 if they fall within certain broad
limitations).
2003] INSIDER TRADING PROPOSALS POST ENRON 717
benefit and protection of registration. '68 Certainly this has merit.
But volume limitations can also be used to put the brakes on large
unregistered sales by corporate insiders.169 Rule 144 was meant as a
convenience, to allow corporate insiders to easily sell small
amounts of securities without having to go through the time and
expense of a full registration. There is nothing wrong with this
theory.1'7 But Rule 144 should not be available as an alternative to
full registration when the corporate insider is selling substantially
all of her holdings. In that case, the stockholders, and the investing
public, have a right to require full registration and all the
protection that it affords. The offered proposal works to avoid
massive sell offs that are below the current Rule 144 volume
limitations by limiting the amount of securities that a corporate
insider can sell at one time. In the case of purchases, similar
volume limitation would serve to discourage massive buying in
advance of advantageous news. This is important because each
purchase by the employee is a sale by one of her employers, a
stockholder. Central to this proposal is the conceptual basis that
corporate information, good, bad or indifferent belongs to all the
stockholders, not any one employee or group of employees.
D. ReVeal Section 16b
Section 16(b) would have outlived its usefulness after adoption
of the proposals outlined above, and should be repealed as no
longer necessary and serving no legitimate purpose. 7' Short term
buying and selling would no longer be a concern if there were
168. See J. William Hicks, The Concept of Transaction As a Restraint on Resale
Limitations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 438 (1988).
169. See Fried, supra note 166, at 352-53 (claiming that although not explicitly
aimed at insider trading, Rule 144 can reduce insider trading profits).
170. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (And Others)
Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 Ky. L.J.
127, 156 (1985) (stating that Rule 144 was promulgated in order to correct the
problems associated with common law public re-sales).
171. For an excellent analysis on section 16(b) and its repeal, see Michael H.
Dessent, Weapons to Fight Insider Trading in the 21st Century: A Call for the
Repeal of Section 16(b), 33 AKRON L. REv. 481 (2000).
718 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
advance notice of purchases and sales and reasons were stated for
all to consider. Likewise, it seems senseless to impose a section
16(b) restriction to sales that are the subject of a full registration
process against purchases limited by volume and announced prior
to execution.
VII. CONCLUSION
Public trust must be earned, and once lost is difficult to
recapture. In the dark days of 1933, it took fundamental changes
in governmental involvement in the securities industry and
sweeping legislation to restore investor confidence.' Perhaps the
time has come to reconsider the relationship between a public
corporation and its senior management when it comes to securities
purchases and sales. The owners of a public corporation, its
stockholders, have the responsibility to compensate its senior
management fairly, and to grant incentives that unite the
stockholders' interests in the company's profitability, growth and
appreciation of value with the interests of senior management.
This is in the stockholders own best interest. However,
stockholders have the right to expect that senior management,
once incentive-ized through stock ownership, will not disunite that
commonality of interest by trading in these securities to the
detriment of the stockholders. This happens, of course, when
senior management trades before informing stockholders.
There can be no doubt that senior management has every right
to realize gains on stock ownership. That is, after all, the point.
But management should not profit at the expense of the other
stockholders. The modest proposals outlined above address this
tension and seek to once again level the playing field. The first
proposal merely re-states the original statutory framework.'73 That
is, that when corporate insiders wish to sell securities, they must
register the sale with the SEC pursuant to section 5 of the
172. For a good historical analysis of these changes, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 73-100
(Northeastern University Press 1995).
173. See supra Part VI.A.
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Securities Act."' This brings with it all the protection that
registration was designed to afford in the first place.175 Surely there
can be no disagreement that this ought to be the standard method
of corporate insider sales to the public market. It was what was
intended in the beginning. Rather than the exception, such
registration should be the rule, literally, as well as figuratively.
The remaining proposals soften what has become an abuse of
the simplified Rule 144 mechanism. Rule 144 was intended to
allow small sales without cumbersome registration.'76 These
proposals re-establish that principle.
174. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
175. See discussion supra Part II.
176. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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